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DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS. By Robert A. Dahl. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 1989. Pp. viii, 397. $29.95. 
What limits, if any, should an unelected judiciary respect in a de­
mocracy? Although Democracy and Its Critics will not settle the per­
ennial debate over this question, this thoughtful defense of democratic 
values does provide a theoretical justification for leaving public policy 
decisions squarely in the domain of democratically elected representa­
tives. In this most recent of his many works, Robert Dahl1 reaffirms 
the democratic process "as the most reliable means for protecting and 
advancing the good and interests of all the persons subject to collective 
decisions" (p. 322). He also defends democracy against what he sees 
as its most threatening competitor: guardianship, or the view that 
only a specially qualified elite can govern for the common good (p. 
52). Dahl's defense of democracy is of particular interest to the legal 
community since the arguments others have made to justify judicial 
policymaking often resemble those justifying guardianship. Time 
spent with Democracy and Its Critics will repay both the scholar and 
the general reader with insight into the issues of democratic theory 
that bear on the continual debate over the proper role of an indepen­
dent judiciary in a democratic society. 
Simply put, democracy means rule by the people. Dahl elaborates 
on this literal definition by specifying the requirements for democratic 
decisionmaking (pp. 108-14). For Dahl, a democratic process must 
make effective participation and voting equality available to all adults 
who are subject to the binding collective decisions of society. A de­
mocracy must also provide citizens with opportunities for understand­
ing civic issues, as well as allow them to have control over the matters 
that reach the decisionmaking agenda. 
Dahl builds his case for the democratic process from the funda­
mental notion of the intrinsic equality of all persons. Intrinsic equal­
ity, in Dahl's view, means that the interests of all persons should be 
given equal consideration in making collective decisions (pp. 85-88). 
The best way to assure the equal consideration of interests is through a 
democratic process where each person is entitled to participate in col­
lective decisionmaking. Dahl favors a strong presumption that every 
adult is the best judge of his or her own interests (p. 100). After all, 
I. Robert Dahl, the Sterling Professor of Political Science Emeritus at Yale University, is 
author of numerous books, including A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); WHO Gov­
ERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CiTY (1961); POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION 
AND OBSERVATION (1971); DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CON­
TROL (1982); and DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY, AND EQUALITY (1986). He has also authored many 
articles, including Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy­
Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). 
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Dahl argues, no one else has the same privileged position as I do to 
understand what my interests are. Moreover, historical experience 
shows that even if others fully understood my interests, they would 
not have the same incentives as I have to defend these interests in the 
decisionmaking process (p. 104). 
The idea that the interests of all persons should be given equal 
consideration, when combined with the presumption that each person 
is the best judge of his or her own interests, leads to what Dahl calls 
the " Strong Principle of Equality" (pp. 31-32). This principle holds 
that 
[a]ll members are sufficiently well qualified, taken all around, to partici­
pate in making the collective decisions binding on the association that 
significantly affect their good or interests. In any case, none are so defi­
nitely better qualified than the others that they should be entrusted with 
making the collective and binding decisions. [p. 98; italics omitted]. 
The necessity for democratic process follows directly from this princi­
ple. Since no person or group of persons is uniquely qualified to gov­
ern- because each person is the best judge of his or her interests­
anything short of full participation will not adequately ensure the 
equal consideration of everyone's interests. 
The democratic process is justified, argues Dahl, because it best 
serves the interests of all individuals in society (p. 322). Democracy 
maximizes freedom by embracing basic political rights and liberties, 
such as free expression, and allows "persons to live under laws of their 
own choosing" (pp. 88-89). Political participation by the public in a 
democracy fosters the desirable qualities of "independence, self-reli­
ance, and public-spiritedness,"2 and it provides opportunities for indi­
viduals to develop their full capacities. Finally, because participation 
in collective decision making is open to all, democracy - more than 
any other alternative - gives citizens the opportunity to satisfy other 
important social, cultural, and economic interests. In Dahl's estima­
tion, "a democratic government provides an orderly and peaceful pro­
cess by means of which a majority of citizens can induce the 
government to do what they most want it to do and to avoid doing 
what they most want it not to do" (p. 95). 
Despite his conviction that democracy is the best available means 
of collective decisionmaking, Dahl never claims that implementing 
democratic ideals is easy. 3 He quite openly acknowledges that no na­
tion today fully satisfies the theoretical requirements of a perfect de-
2. P. 92. Dahl notes that John Stuart Mill also made this claim over a century ago. 
3. Indeed, Dahl devotes chapters 10 through 14 of Democracy and Its Critics to the 
problems presented in implementing democratic decision making. He gives particular attention 
to the problems associated with majority rule, including cyclic voting patterns and majority dom­
ination of minorities. See, e.g., pp. 144-52. Despite the "inevitable imperfections" (p. 177) of 
democracy in practice, Dahl remains convinced that no better alternative form of collective deci­
sion making exists. 
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mocracy (p. 117). One fundamental criticism often leveled against 
democracy is that in practice it can lead to unjust outcomes, especially 
when a majority deprives a minority of its substantive rights or inter­
ests. Dahl responds to this objection first by emphasizing that the 
democratic process itself requires the protection of many fundamental 
rights and interests, either as integral to the democratic process (such 
as free speech or free assembly) or as external to the democratic pro­
cess but still necessary for its effective operation (such as a broad dis­
tribution of a minimum of economic and political resources) (pp. 175-
76). Dahl believes that even an imperfect democratic process cannot 
be achieved without the commitment of the citizenry to a wide array 
of substantive rights, and therefore a strong commitment to democ­
racy is the best possible means of protecting these rights. In any case, 
he argues, even though real world democracies may at times mistak­
enly infringe on substantive rights and interests, "the risk of mistake 
exists in all regimes in the real world, and the worst blunders of this 
century have been made by leaders in nondemocratic regimes" (p. 78). 
Nevertheless, as Dahl concedes, the democratic process can be and 
has been used by majorities to deny others a variety of substantive 
rights and interests. These include those fundamental rights and inter­
ests that are integral and necessary to democracy, as well as other in­
terests - like economic equality or efficiency - that are valued on 
independent grounds. Dahl finds it inevitable that, in the real world, 
democratic processes will on occasion lead to the denial of some per­
sons' fundamental rights or interests. The level to which democracies 
of the world today have advanced, he writes, "is far from complete 
judged by the criteria of the democratic process" (p. 177). 
When the democratic process is used to deprive others of their fun­
damental rights or interests, many "American lawyers typically as­
sume that the solution must include a supreme court with the 
authority to strike down national legislation that violates fundamental 
rights and interests." (p. 192). The standard argument advanced is 
that an independent and unelected judiciary serves as a 
countermajoritarian check on democratic decision making via its au­
thority to declare legislation unconstitutional. Although Dahl con­
cedes that nonmajoritarian arrangements, including judicial review, do 
not necessarily violate the requirements for democracy, he does cau­
tion against relying on judicial review as a correction for failures in the 
democratic process. When fundamental rights and interests in a de­
mocracy are protected by judges who are not democratically accounta­
ble, the result, according to Dahl, is a form of quasi guardianship (pp. 
187-88). And quasi guardianship faces the same objection that pure 
guardianship does, namely that when it comes to making moral judg­
ments or balancing between competing values, judges (like any other 
guardians) simply do not have privileged claims to absolute 
knowledge. 
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Moreover, Dahl presents four additional arguments against relying 
on judicial guardianship (pp. 188-91 ). First, he argues that judicial 
guardianship is simply not necessary to correct failures in the demo­
cratic process. After all, no other country has as expansive a judicial 
review power as the United States, and a number of democratic coun­
tries have no judicial review at all. According to Dahl, it simply can­
not be said that fundamental rights and interests are less protected in 
these other countries than they are in the United States (pp. 188-89). 
Furthermore, Dahl identifies other ways to prevent or alleviate 
problems in the democratic process without resorting to guardianship: 
for example, changing the size of the citizenry so that minority rights 
and interests may be protected; establishing safeguards in voting, elec­
tion, or legislative procedures (such as by creating bicameral legisla­
tures or requiring majorities of two thirds); and relying on public 
opinion to evolve (as historically it has on many issues) to the point 
where particular minority rights and interests are ultimately vindi­
cated (pp. 184-87). 
Second, Dahl makes the obvious point that judicial guardianship 
encroaches on the democratic process. "The broader the scope of the 
rights and interests the quasiguardians are authorized to protect, the 
more they must take on the functions of making law and policy" (p. 
189). Judicial review takes some matters out of the domain of demo­
cratic decision making. Consequently, the more a nation relies on 
judicial review, the less it can utilize the democratic process. 
Third, Dahl maintains that the more judicial guardianship en­
croaches on the democratic process, the less need democratic repre­
sentatives may see to exercise self-restraint: "Quasi guardianship may 
therefore require less self-restraint on the part of the [citizenry] and its 
representatives and more externally imposed restraint by judicial 
guardians. Over time, the political culture may come to incorporate 
the expectation that the judicial guardians can be counted on to fend 
off violations of fundamental rights ... " (p. 189). In other words, the 
problems of quasi guardianship may become self-perpetuating, as the 
public comes to rely on unelected judges for protection of rights and 
interests rather than on the democratic process. 
Finally, Dahl reminds us that judicial guardians have not always 
stood steadfast in the protection of fundamental rights.4 "The reputa­
tion of the U.S. Supreme Court [for protecting rights]," Dahl observes, 
"rests mainly on a period of judicial activism beginning in 1954 when 
4. P. 189. Although Dahl does not discuss specific cases, Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214 (1944). undoubtedly provides the twentieth-century American paradigm of judicial 
failure to protect minority rights. The vindication of minority rights in this instance has come 
not from the Supreme Court, but from the evolution of public opinion recognizing the wrongful­
ness of the internment and from action (albeit belated) by the majoritarian branches compensat­
ing those who were injured. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 1989-1989b 
(West Supp. 1989). 
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the Court was presided over by Chief Justice Earl Warren" (pp. 189-
90). Dahl would undoubtedly agree that the changing composition of 
the Court during the Reagan-Bush years may well detract from the 
attractiveness of judicial guardianship in the eyes of many observers. 
As Dahl notes, "[I]t is striking how much attitudes toward the power 
of the Court during any given period depend on whether the Court's 
decisions fit the ideological perspective of the observer" (p. 358 n.5). 
Despite these problems with judicial guardianship, Dahl concedes 
that such guardianship can be reconciled with democratic process, but 
only "if the authority of the judicial guardians is sufficiently re­
stricted" (p. 190). The authority of the judicial guardian to protect 
rights integral to the democratic process, he states, is consistent with 
democracy: "The criteria for the democratic process do not specify 
how the process itself is to be maintained. For a court to strike down 
laws that violate the criteria themselves would surely not be inconsis­
tent with those criteria" (p. 191 ). 
However, when it comes to allowing judicial guardians to have au­
thority over interests that are not essential to the democratic process, 
Dahl finds the conflict "irreconcilable" (p. 191 ). Decisions about ad­
vancing or balancing substantive interests, he argues, are policy deci­
sions and should be made through the democratic process. "Once the 
rights and other interests necessary to the democratic process have 
been effectively secured, then the more the quasi guardians extend 
their authority to substantive questions, the more they reduce the 
scope of the democratic process" (p. 191). 
Dahl's theory leads to a way of reconciling a limited form of judi­
cial guardianship with democracy, but it rejects any broad form of 
judicial policymaking. In this respect, Dahl's political theory pro­
vides a foundation for a theory of judicial review similar to that found 
in John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust, 5 a work which Dahl him­
self cites (pp. 191, 359 n.9). Judicial review is justified when it is prop­
erly used to maintain the democratic process; it is not justified as a 
substitute for a democratic policymaking process. Thus, giving the 
judiciary the authority to strike down laws that violate rights of free 
speech or free assembly does not necessarily contravene the demo­
cratic ideal. However, permitting unelected judges to make substan­
tive policy decisions under the guise of constitutional or statutory 
interpretation clearly raises serious problems for democratic theory. 
In recent decades, a noticeable trend has developed in which 
unelected judges have adopted such an active role, and have taken to 
setting - and at times administering - public policy.6 Interest 
5. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
6. See, e.g., D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 19 (1977); COUNCIL ON THE 
ROLE OF COURTS, THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 19 (J. Lieberman ed. 1984). 
Perhaps one of the clearest examples of a judge establishing public policy can be found in Sierra 
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groups have discovered the courts as an alternative forum for poli­
cymaking when they lose their battles in the legislature. 7 And some 
observers apparently even think that judicial policymaking is justified 
precisely because of the inability of the democratic political process to 
achieve certain substantive results. 8
In Democracy and Its Critics, Dahl responds to the danger that this 
trend toward judicial guardianship poses for democracy. He bril­
liantly defends democracy against its critics, including those who 
would have judges play the active role of guardians in our society. 
Lawyers and legal scholars will benefit from the theoretical context 
this book brings to the debate over judicial policymaking, and the 
reader will appreciate the clarity and thoroughness of Dahl's entire 
argument. In the end, Democracy and Its Critics reminds us that, 
although democratic regimes have been far from perfect, they are nev­
ertheless the best available form of collective decision making. 
- Cary Coglianese 
Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972). In this case, the district court judge 
required the Environmental Protection Agency to develop what turned out to be a large, cumber­
some, and detailed program to prevent the significant deterioration of air quality in areas of the 
country with pristine air. The judge found nothing in the operative text of the Clean Air Act 
that would justify his policy choice, but claimed that the program was required mainly because 
the purpose of the Act, as stated in the preamble, was to "protect and enhance" air quality. 344 
F. Supp. at 255. 
Some of the clearest examples of judges administering public policy can be found in Wyatt v. 
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.), modified sub 
nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1972) (state mental health facilities), and Pugh 
v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), a.ffd. and remanded sub nom. Newman v. Ala­
bama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), revd. in part per curiam sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 
781 (1978) (state prisons). In both of these cases, the district court judge assumed an active role 
in managing state institutions by issuing decrees that imposed painstakingly detailed standards 
on the operation of the institutions. 
7. See, e.g., H. JACOB, JusTICE IN AMERICA (4th ed. 1984). As Herbert Jacob has 
commented: 
The fact that courts make policy conditions the political process in the United States. It 
opens another avenue for seeking favorable decisions for those who are unsuccessful with 
the legislature or executive. If a group fails to capture or hold a legislative majority, and if it 
fails to elect its candidate as chief executive of the state or nation, it may nevertheless seek to 
alter public policy through litigation. 
Jd. at 45; see also L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES 20-24 (1988); M. KLEIN, LAW, 
COURTS, AND POLICY 158-59 (1984). 
8. See, e.g., R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS 69 (1983) ("Some writers have 
suggested another Constitution-based rationale for judicial activism, that courts should correct 
'political failure.' According to this argument the judiciary has an obligation to counterbalance 
the political biases of Congress and the executive branch."); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in 
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1313 (1976) ("[T]he growth of judicial power has 
been, in large part, a function of the failure of other agencies to respond to the groups that have 
been able to mobilize considerable political resources and energy."); Cramton, Judicial Law 
Making and Administration, 36 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 551, 554 (1976) ("Nature abhors a vacuum 
and the inaction of the executive and lawmaking branches creates pressures for judicial ac­
tion . . . .  Judicial activism, it appears, has the approval of the intellectual elite who have become 
disillusioned with the effectiveness of social change by other means. "). 
